Six years on, a UK presence still doesn’t grant EU market access — and plenty of American companies still assume it does. A recent trade agreement review softened some of the friction, but the core wall most US companies get wrong remains fully in place.
The wall that’s still standing, and why it keeps catching companies off guard
The practical consequences of that misunderstanding are real and specific. Sales activity conducted from a UK entity into the EU can trigger a taxable permanent establishment in an EU member state if the structure isn’t carefully planned from the outset — a genuine trap for a company that assumed its UK subsidiary alone was sufficient coverage for European operations. Beyond the tax exposure, Brexit’s impact on company formation has proven durable rather than transitional: as UK and EU regulatory frameworks continue evolving independently of each other, businesses face genuinely diverging legal standards, increased compliance costs from maintaining separate registrations in both jurisdictions, and a real strategic reassessment of corporate structure that simply wasn’t necessary before 2020.
A further risk that consistently surprises American executives specifically involves personal liability. Individuals appointed to a UK company’s board — including US directors managing the relationship from across the Atlantic — are subject to UK statutory duties and can face genuine personal liability for certain tax and regulatory failures, a meaningfully different exposure model than most American directors are used to domestically. Recent reforms to Companies House and broader UK economic crime legislation have specifically increased scrutiny of overseas-owned entities, making the UK subsidiary a genuinely higher-maintenance structure than many US groups initially budget for.
The recent softening most content hasn’t caught up to yet
Here’s the update worth knowing, because it’s recent enough that a lot of Brexit-impact commentary still describes a harder wall than currently exists. A May 2026 review of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement meaningfully reduced regulatory friction specifically through shared digital trade standards — a genuine, current easing that lets companies treat the UK and EU as close neighbours rather than entirely separate regulatory planets for practical dual-entity planning purposes. This doesn’t undo the core structural separation described above; a UK entity still doesn’t grant EU market access on its own. What it does mean is that the operational cost of running coordinated UK-and-EU structures has genuinely decreased compared to the friction that defined the first several years after Brexit took effect — worth factoring into a 2026 expansion plan rather than assuming the maximum-friction scenario still fully applies.
The emerging standard structure: dual entities, not a single stepping stone
The practical response most sophisticated US expansion planning has settled on is a genuinely dual structure rather than the old single-entity stepping-stone model. Ireland has emerged as the cleanest gateway into the EU single market specifically — English-speaking, common-law, with a low corporate tax rate that makes it a natural bridge for American companies who want EU access without the linguistic and legal-system adjustment a civil-law country would require. I’ve written separately about Ireland’s own corporate tax position and why its appeal has held up even through the OECD’s global minimum tax changes, in my piece on Ireland‘s corporate tax advantage. The UK, meanwhile, retains genuine standalone value for companies specifically targeting UK customers or financial markets — London’s status as a global financial hub persists despite Brexit, and I’ve covered the specific structural reasons the financial sector in particular still concentrates there and in a small number of EU centers in my piece on Frankfurt‘s continued role as Europe’s regulatory-anchored banking capital.
A third, more specialized pattern is worth naming for a specific category of company: Belgium, and Brussels specifically, draws businesses whose work is genuinely regulatory-affairs-adjacent — companies involved in EU policy engagement, lobbying, or compliance work that benefits directly from physical proximity to the EU institutions themselves, a genuinely different rationale than the market-access logic driving most other location decisions on this list.
Financial services led the relocation wave — and the pattern generalized
Academic research tracking the actual relocation decisions of financial service firms following Brexit found a measurable, documented pattern: firms shifted operations from London to a small set of leading continental European financial centers, largely following what researchers describe as a “least necessary relocation” logic — moving just enough regulated activity to maintain EU market access, while retaining as much of their London presence and talent base as the new regulatory reality allowed. That pattern, first visible in financial services specifically because the sector faced the earliest and clearest regulatory deadlines, has since generalized across other industries facing the same underlying UK-versus-EU access question, even if their specific compliance timelines were less urgent than banking’s.
What this means for planning an expansion in 2026
The practical framework starts with abandoning the single-entity mental model entirely. A company planning genuine UK and EU operations should expect to build and maintain two coordinated but legally distinct structures, budgeting for separate VAT registration, separate employment law compliance, and separate regulatory relationships in each jurisdiction — not treating one as a natural extension of the other. Ireland remains the standard recommendation for the EU-facing entity specifically because of its language, legal system, and tax profile, while the UK entity should be evaluated on its own standalone merits — financial market access, UK customer base, UK talent — rather than assumed to double as EU coverage.
Director liability deserves specific attention before appointing US executives to a UK board without fully understanding the personal statutory exposure that comes with it, and the May 2026 TCA review is worth factoring into current planning as a genuine, if partial, reduction in the operational friction that made dual-entity structures so costly in Brexit’s immediate aftermath. None of this makes the UK or the EU individually harder to enter than before — it simply means treating them as the two separate markets they’ve now definitively become, rather than the single connected one they were before 2020.
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